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Law and Justice Commission of Pakistan |
FILLING A LEGAL VACUUM
No
matter how developed a legal system is, it can seldom keep pace with the
socio-economic changes that occur in the society, thereby necessitating a
continuous review of the legal system so as to modernise and update its provisions.
Review and reform of the legal system is essential in order to make it
effective and keep it operational. Notwithstanding such reform, there still
remains some areas/situations which are not adequately covered by the existing
legislation. Such an uncovered area/situation is referred to as legal
void/vacuum/gap. It is not unoften when during the course of judicial
proceedings the courts come across gaps - situations/circumstances uncovered or
unaccounted for by any existing statutory, customary or general provision of
law. In such an eventuality it is the duty of the court to fill the legal void/
vacuum through the exercise of their discretionary power, by either seeking
guidance from a similar other provision of law on the subject or by applying
the rules of equity, justice and good conscience to the situation. This is a
universal phenomenon and is confronted
by the judiciary in almost every jurisdiction. In the context of Pakistan,
however, a peculiar situation exists. Here such legal void is caused by the
operation of the Constitution itself. Article 203-D of the Constitution says
that the Federal Shariat Court may strike down a certain provision of law if it
considers that such provision is repugnant to the injunctions of Islam. As a
result of this provision scores of laws/rules have been struck down by the Court but have not been
substituted through legislative action,
thereby causing legal void/vacuum in the system. The mechanism for filling such vacuum through legislative reforms has been very slow and
hardly has any law declared repugnant by the Court, been substituted through
legislation on time. This obviously
causes uncertainty, chaos and confusion, and
has been a source of great inconvenience to the State as well as general
public. The superior judiciary has time and again deliberated upon this issue,
and in the course of judgments, given certain
proposals and guidelines for resolving the problem [1].
Inspired
by the judicial dictum on the subject and feeling the urgent need for suggesting
appropriate reforms in the area, the Pakistan Law Commission examined this issue and approved necessary
reforms on the subject, suggesting appropriate changes in the relevant
legislation i.e. General Clauses Act, 1897. The draft law having already been
approved by the Commission, has since been submitted to the Government.
The
earlier history of Indo-Pakistan Sub-continent reveals that colonial masters
sought to rule this area through their
own system of laws and administration of justice. The Charter of East India
Company (1661) provided that persons
under the suzerainty of the Company shall be dealt with and judged, both in
civil and criminal cases, in accordance with the British system of laws. This policy was implemented through
various measures including newly promulgated statutes stating that Indian
affairs shall be governed under the British law, in preference to Indian law on
the subject. For instance, the Indian Divorce Act, 1869 provided that in
divorce proceedings the courts should follow the principles which "are as
nearly as may be conformable to the principles and rules on which the court for
Divorce and Matrimonial Causes in England for the time being acts and gives
relief". Due to such deliberate
policy the judiciary, while filling vacuum, applied British laws and rules in
preference to the Indian laws [2].
This
trend, however, did not last for long as the
application of English concepts and principles created many practical
complications. For instance, the 1904 Privy Council decision in the case of Abdul Fata [3] by applying the British law
to a subject (Waqf) covered by the Muslim Personal Law, created an embarrassing
situation for the government, as the decision was severely criticised by the
Muslims, it being considered as an interference in their religious affairs.
Consequently, the resulting mischief
had to be corrected through legislation [4]. Thus, in the subsequent cases, one
notices a major shift in the attitude of the judiciary when the judges began to
exercise their discretion more judiciously by also applying the Indian law and
norms to the situation. In several cases the judges indeed applied the Indian
norms and rules in preference to the British laws and principles. Syed Mehmood,
Judge, (Allahabad High Court) in his dissenting opinion in the case of Seth
Chitor Mal v Shib Lal [5], indeed
warned of the inherent danger of applying
the English law in an area essentially covered by the Muslim Personal
Law. He observed that since the concept of equity, justice and good conscience
are incapable of exact and exhaustive
definition, therefore, while administering it to India, exceptional care must
be taken and the Indian norms and rules on the subject should also be examined
on the subject. Thus the subsequent
judicial history of pre-independence India is replete with precedents wherein
in order to fill the gaps in law, rather than applying the English norms, the
Islamic principles and rules of equity, justice and good conscience were
applied to the situation [6]. It can
thus be safely established that in pre-partition India Muslim law was applied
as a residuary law in the form of rules of equity, justice and good conscience.
This
trend was not just retained but pursued more vigorously by the judiciary of
Pakistan. Mr Justice Mohammad Afzal
Zullah, Judge, Lahore High Court (as he then was) relying on the theme
(dissenting view in Seth Chitor Mal v Shib Lal) of Syed Mehmood, Judge,
observed that while filling the gaps the courts must not follow any foreign
notion of justice, equity and good
conscience in preference to Islamic norms on the subject [7]. Quoting extensively from the pre as well as
post-partition judicial history of the country, he concluded that the Islamic
principles, norms, jurisprudence and philosophy shall govern the discretion of judges, when called upon to
fill any vacuum in law. This view was further elaborated by the Supreme Court
judgment in the case of Mohammad Bashir v State [8]. The Court observed that when the statute is silent about a situation
or there is a legal void to be filled, the Court shall apply the Islamic
philosophy and jurisprudence on the subject [9]. This view was further reiterated by the Court in the case of
Federation of Pakistan v Government of NWFP [10]. The Court held that in a
state of vacuum the common Islamic
law/injunctions of Islam shall be deemed to be the law on the subject and be
applied accordingly.
The
successive Courts while deliberating upon this issue were indeed influenced by
the scheme of Islamisation of laws in our Constitution. Several provisions in
the Constitution speak of Islamising the existing legal system in the country.
The effect of various constitutional articles, such as Article 2, 2A, 31(1),
227 and 268(6) makes it obligatory for the State organs and its functionaries to follow and apply the
Islamic provisions of law, in preference to any other (foreign) principles and
laws. Thus, in consonance with the
constitutional mandate and in line with the direction of the superior
judiciary, the Commission proposes the following new section (Section 5B) to be
added to the General Clauses Act, 1897:
"5B. Application of
Injunctions of Islam on laws held repugnant to Holy Quran and Sunnah of the
Holy Prophet.- Where any law or a
provision thereof is held by the final competent Court to be repugnant to the
Injunctions of Islam, as laid down in the Holy Quran and Sunnah, and such law
or provision thereof is not brought in conformity with such Injunctions within
the period specified by such Court, the resulting gap, void, vacuum in
legislation shall be filled by common Islamic law on the subject."
References
1. Haji Nizam
Khan v Additional District Judge, Lyallpur,
PLD
1976 Lah 930; Mohammad Bashir v State, PLD 1982 SC 139;
Federation of Pakistan v Government of NWFP, PLD 1990 SC 1172;
Fazle
Ghafoor v Chairman, Tribunal Land Dispute, SCMR (1973) 1073.
2. Waghela v
Masluddin (1887) 14 1A 89; Bireswar Gosh v Panchcouri Gosh,
AIR
1923 Cal 538.
3. (184-95) 22
1A 76 = ILR 22 Cal 619
4. Waqf
Validation Act, 1913
5. (1892) 14 All
273
6. Hamira Bibi v
Zubaida Bibi, AIR 1916 PC 46;
Bireswar Gosh v Panchcouri Gosh, op cit
7. Haji Nizam
Khan v Additional District Judge, Lyallpur, op cit
8. PLD 1982 SC
139
9. Fazle Ghafoor
v Chairman, Tribunal Land Dispute, op cit;
see also
Pakistan v Public-at-Large, PLD 1986 SC 240
10. PLD 1990 SC 1172
GENERAL CLAUSES (AMENDMENT) ACT,
1993
An Act further to amend General Clauses Act, 1897.
Whereas it is expedient further to amend General Clauses
Act, 1897 (X of 1897) for the purpose hereinafter appearing.
It is hereby enacted as follows:
1. Short title and commencement.- (1) This
Act may be called General Clauses
(Amendment)
Act, 1993.
(2) It shall come into force at once.
2. Insertion of a new Section 5B in Act X
of 1897.- In the General Clauses
Act,
1897 (X of 1897), after Section 5A, the following new Section 5B shall be
inserted,
namely,
"5B. Where any law or provision of law is
declared by the Court to be repugnant to the injunctions of Islam, as laid down
in the Holy Quran and Sunnah, and such law or provision of law is not brought
in conformity with such injunctions within the period specified, the resulting
gap, void, vacuum in legislation shall be filled by the common Islamic law on
the subject".
STATEMENT OF OBJECTS AND
REASONS
This
recommendation of the Pakistan Law Commission seeks to amend the General
Clauses Act to add a new Section 5B in the Act to provide for filling up gaps,
voids, vacuum occurred in a law or a provision of law declared repugnant to Shariah by the Court.
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